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WITH GREAT POWER COMES IGNORED 
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT 
FAILED TO SAVE SPIDER-MAN 
Maya Zagayer 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the famous words of Spider-Man’s Uncle Ben, “[I]n this 
world, with great power there must also come—great 
responsibility.”1 The Supreme Court may be endowed with 
inordinate power, but it ignored its responsibility to properly 
interpret and apply the law in its recent decision, Kimble v. Marvel 
Entertainment, LLC.2 The Court was given the opportunity to right a 
long-standing wrong by overturning erroneous precedent; instead the 
Court unjustifiably applied a “superpowered form of stare decisis,”3 
thereby reaffirming the flawed decision. 
In a 6-3 split, the Court reiterated the boundaries of patent 
protection as it pertains to the exaction of royalties, holding that “a 
patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of his invention 
after its term has expired,”4 notwithstanding a contractual agreement 
that stipulates otherwise.5 There, Respondent Marvel Entertainment, 
LLC (“Marvel”) purchased the patent rights to a Spider-Man toy 
from Petitioner Stephen Kimble (“Kimble”) and agreed to pay 
Kimble a three percent royalty on all future sales of the toy, without 
setting a projected end-date for the royalty payments.6 Upon the 
patent’s expiration, Marvel refused to continue paying Kimble 
 
 . J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Communication and 
Media Studies, 2011, University of California, Santa Barbara. 
 1. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (quoting STAN LEE & 
STEVE DITKO, AMAZING FANTASY NO. 15: SPIDER-MAN 13 (1962)). 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 2401. 
 3. Id. at 2410. 
 4. Id. at 2405. 
 5. See id. at 2407 (indicating that “‘an article on which the patent has expired’. . . may be 
made and sold by whoever chooses to do so. . . . [W]e have deemed unenforceable private 
contract provisions limiting free use of such inventions.” (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel 
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964))). 
 6. Id. at 2403. 
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royalties, referencing the Court’s decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,7 
which held that a royalty provision extending beyond the life of the 
patent is unlawful per se.8 
In response, Kimble asked the Court to overturn its decision in 
Brulotte, arguing that the duration of royalty payments for patented 
inventions should be assessed on a case-by-case basis in accordance 
with antitrust law’s “rule-of-reason.”9 The Court applied the doctrine 
of stare decisis, stating that Kimble had failed to prove the requisite 
“special justification” for overruling a case, while adding that the 
matter presented was one “more appropriately addressed to 
Congress.”10 Consequently, the Court declined to depart from the 
precedent set by Brulotte and affirmed the lower court’s decision to 
refuse to enforce the contract agreement insofar as it provided for 
post-patent expiration royalties.11  
Though the Supreme Court has the power to interpret and apply 
the law, the superpower of defining the law’s parameters belongs 
only to Congress. The Constitution enumerates congressional power 
in eighteen specific clauses, one of which reads: “The Congress shall 
have power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”12  The Patent 
Act of 1793 (“the Act”)13, which highlights the concern for the 
protection and promotion of intellectual property rights, was among 
the first to be acknowledged by the framers of the Constitution as a 
vital component to the advancement of society.14 The goal of the Act 
was to strike a balance between incentivizing the creation of new and 
useful discoveries by securing inventors a monopoly over their 
discoveries, while also providing the public unfettered access to such 
innovations.15 Accordingly, patent holders are given exclusive 
 
 7. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
 8. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405. 
 9. Id. at 2404. For an explanation of the “rule-of-reason,” see infra note 62. 
 10. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405. 
 11. Id. 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 13. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318–323 (1793). 
 14. The Act was notable for its definition of the subjects of patents, which still remains 
unchanged today: “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter and 
any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.” Id. 
 15. E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at 
Common Law, 16 L. Q. REV. 44 (1900) (indicating that patent law derives from “the mediaeval 
policy of the encouragement of new industries and the [] early grants of Elizabeth” which 
endowed a creator with monopoly over his creation). 
Fall 2016] WITH GREAT POWER 753 
control of their inventions, endowing them with “certain 
superpowers, but only for a limited time.”16 Upon that term’s 
expiration, “the unrestricted right to make or use the article passes to 
the public.”17   
This Comment explores the implications of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kimble. Part II discusses the factual background of the 
case; Part III presents the historical background by providing an 
overview of the underlying case, Brulotte v. Thys Co. Part IV 
analyzes the Court’s reasoning in Kimble, while Part V argues that 
the Court erred in applying a heightened standard of stare decisis, 
thus engaged in judicial overreach. Finally, Part VI concludes that 
the Court ignored its responsibility to right a long-standing wrong by 
improperly operating under a guise of statutory interpretation, 
ultimately impeding parties’ ability to contract freely, and 
impermissibly altering the parameters of the Act.   
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1990, Stephen Kimble patented a toy that allowed children 
“and young-at-heart adults” to act like Spider-Man by shooting 
webs—really pressurized foam string—from the palms of their 
hands.18 In the interest of selling or licensing this patent, Kimble met 
with Marvel, who makes and markets products featuring the comic-
book character Spider-Man, to discuss his idea for “web-slinging 
fun.”19 Shortly thereafter, and without compensating Kimble, Marvel 
began selling a toy called the “Web-Blaster” which enabled “would-
be action heroes to mimic Spider-Man through the use of a polyester 
glove and a canister of foam.”20 The Web-Blaster significantly 
resembled Kimble’s patented invention.21  
In 1997, Kimble brought suit against Marvel alleging patent 
infringement, among other claims.22 The suit ultimately ended with a 
settlement agreement whereby Marvel would purchase Kimble’s 
patent in exchange for a lump sum of almost a half-million dollars, 
as well as a three percent royalty on all of Marvel’s future sales of 
 
 16. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2406; see Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318–323. 
 17. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2403 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 18. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,072,856). 
 19. Id. at 2406. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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the Web-Blaster and similar products.23 The parties did not set an 
expiration date for the royalty provision, “apparently contemplating 
that they would continue for as long as kids want to imitate Spider-
Man (by doing whatever a spider can).”24  
Then, Marvel “stumbled across Brulotte”25—the case at the 
heart of this dispute—which interpreted the patent laws as preventing 
a patentee from receiving royalties for sales made after his or her 
patent’s expiration.26 Neither party claimed to have knowledge of 
Brulotte at the time of negotiating the settlement, though “Marvel 
must have been pleased to learn of it”27 considering “the decision’s 
effect was to sunset the settlement’s royalty clause.”28  
Upon making this discovery, Marvel sought a declaratory 
judgment in federal district court confirming that it could cease 
paying Kimble royalties come 2010—the end of Kimble’s patent 
term.29 Relying on the decision in Brulotte, the district court granted 
Marvel’s request for relief, holding that “the royalty provision 
[was] . . . unenforceable after the expiration of the Kimble patent.”30 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit begrudgingly affirmed, 
though made it clear that “the Brulotte rule is counterintuitive, and its 
rationale is arguably unconvincing.”31 Kimble appealed the reward 
for relief, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.32 
III.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
As stated, the Court relied upon the reasoning set out in Brulotte 
v. Thys Co. in making its decision.33 There, the Court decided that 
exacting royalties for a patented invention after the expiration of the 
incorporated patent(s) is equivalent to an assertion of monopoly 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. A patent typically expires twenty years after the date of its application. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a)(2) (2012).  Seven years had lapsed on Kimble’s patent at the time of Kimble and 
Marvel’s settlement agreement; thus thirteen years of exclusive control over the patent remained 
to either be sold or licensed. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2406. 
 25. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2406 (referencing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (quoting Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 692 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1161 (D. Ariz. 
2010)). 
 31. Id. (quoting Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (2013)). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 2405. 
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power over a patent that has entered the public domain.34  
A.  Overview of the Underlying Case 
Thys Company (“Thys”) was the manufacturer of a hop-picking 
machine35 that incorporated seven different patents in its design.36 
Thys sold these machines to Walter Brulotte, a farmer from Yakima 
County, Washington, for a flat fee and issued a license agreement 
detailing the terms of their use.37 That license agreement provided 
that Brulotte would pay Thys royalties in an amount comparable to 
the profits accrued in each harvest season where Thys’s machines 
were used.38 All seven patents incorporated in the hop-picking 
machines expired in 1957; however, the license agreements exacting 
royalty payments for use of those machines extended beyond that 
date.39  
Brulotte refused to pay royalties beyond the patented term, and 
Thys brought an action for breach of their licensing agreement.40 The 
case went all the way to the Supreme Court, where it was ultimately 
decided that the licensing agreement was void insofar as it demanded 
royalties after the last of the patents incorporated into the machines 
had expired.41  
B.  The Court’s Reasoning in Brulotte 
In making this decision, the Court relied on its interpretation of 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to 
secure “for limited times” to inventors the “exclusive right” to their 
discoveries.42 The Court reasoned: 
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as 
 
 34. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). 
 35. Hops are cone-shaped flowers that come in many varieties which “imparts different 
characteristics and flavors to beer” though their industrial use is not limited to the making and 
manufacturing of beer. Farmers and brewers use the aid of hop picking machines for ease and aid 
in harvesting hops. Alison Spiegel, What the Hell Are Hops, Anyway?, THE HUFFINGTON POST, 
June 18, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/18/what-are-hops_n_5503930.html. 
 36. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 30. 
 37. Id. at 29. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 30. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (referencing 35 U.S.C § 154 which provides that “[e]very patent shall contain a short 
title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen 
years, of the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention throughout the 
United States, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.” (emphasis added)). 
756 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:751 
he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly. But to 
use that leverage to project those royalty payments beyond 
the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the 
monopoly of the patent . . . .43 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that such a licensing agreement 
was “unlawful per se”44 and thus unenforceable.45  
Further, the Court, relying upon Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus 
Manufacturing Co.,46 reasoned that “patents are in the federal 
domain,” and thus functions of state law that “run counter to the 
policy and purpose of the patent laws” cannot be used to override the 
objectives set out by Congress, “whatever the legal device 
employed.”47 Consequently, the Court determined that contracts 
and/or licensing agreements may not be used to circumvent patent 
laws, nor may they serve to extend a patent holder’s rights beyond 
the constitutionally protected patentable term.48  
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The question before the Court in Kimble was whether to 
overrule the decision in Brulotte.49 Adhering to the principles of 
stare decisis,50 the Court declined to do so.  
A.  The Court Shielded Itself with a 
“Superpowered Form of Stare Decisis” 
The 6-justice majority first addressed the two “traditional 
justifications”51 for abandoning stare decisis: (1) erosion of doctrinal 
 
 43. Id. at 33.  
 44. Id. at 32. 
 45. See id. at 33–34 (“The exaction of royalties for the use of a machine after the patent has 
expired is an assertion of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when...the patent has 
entered the public domain. . . . [A]fter expiration of the last of the patents incorporated in the 
machines ‘the grant of patent monopoly was spent’ and an attempt to project it into another term 
by continuation of the licensing agreement is unenforceable” (citing Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. 
Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496, 510 (1962))). 
 46. 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945). 
 47. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 31–32 (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Marculus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 
256 (1945)). 
 48. Id. at 32. 
 49. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405. 
 50. “Stare decisis—the idea that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions—is ‘a 
foundation stone of the rule of law.’” Id. at 2409 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014)). “The doctrine rests on the idea . . . that it is usually 
‘more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.’” Id. (citing 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 51. See id. at 2404, 2410–11 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 
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underpinnings and (2) precedent that has proved unworkable. The 
Court concluded that neither of the traditional justifications was 
applicable.52 Moreover, the Court found that this case called for a 
“superpowered form of stare decisis,” thus further reinforcing its 
unwillingness to depart from Brulotte.53  
1.  Erosion of Doctrinal Underpinnings 
The Court noted that “the primary reason” for overruling 
statutory precedent is when subsequent legal developments, such as 
growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress, 
unseats the foundational reasoning of a past decision.54 The Court 
concluded that Brulotte’s statutory and doctrinal underpinnings had 
not eroded over time because “the core feature of the patent laws on 
which Brulotte relied remains just the same.”55 Moreover, the Court 
explained that when a decision, like Brulotte, interprets a statute, 
“stare decisis carries enhanced force.”56  
2.  Nothing About Brulotte Has Proved Unworkable 
Further, the Court reasoned that the “Brulotte rule” is simple to 
apply because “[a] court need only ask whether a licensing 
agreement provides royalties for post-expiration use of a patent. If 
not, no problem; if so, no dice.”57 Conversely, Kimble argued that 
courts should employ antitrust law’s rule-of-reason to identify and 
invalidate those post-expiration royalty provisions with anti-
competitive consequences, calling for an alternative approach 
requiring a case-by-case assessment of the validity of post-patent 
expiration royalty agreements. Nevertheless, the Court concluded 
that the ease of use and application that the Brulotte decision 
provides is not only “workable” but is easier and more determinative 
 
(1989) as identifying “erosion of doctrinal underpinnings” and “unworkability” as traditional 
justifications for overruling precedent).  
 52. Id. at 2404. 
 53. Id. at 2410. 
 54. Id. (referencing Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173). 
 55. Id. The Supreme Court references 35 U.S.C. § 154, Contents and Term of Patent; noting 
that the statute then, as it does now, “draws a sharp line cutting off patent rights after a set number 
of years.” Id. at 2410-11. The Court also notes that patent laws have remained largely unchanged 
since their creation, and that earlier cases which have relied upon such laws, like Scott Paper Co. 
v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945)—the decision on which Brulotte primarily relied—
remains good law. Id. at 2411. 
 56. Id. at 2404. 
 57. Id. at 2411. 
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“when compared to Kimble’s proposed alternative.”58 Hence, 
Brulotte need not be overturned on “unworkable” grounds.  
3.  “Superpowered” Form of Stare Decisis 
The Court then strengthened its unwillingness to depart from 
precedent by adding that “Brulotte lies at the intersection of two 
areas of law: property (patents) and contracts (licensing 
agreements),” and that considerations favoring stare decisis are “at 
their acme” in cases involving such rights because parties are 
especially likely to rely on such precedent.59 Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that “[a]s against this superpowered form of stare decisis, 
we would need a superspecial justification to warrant revising 
Brulotte.”60 
B.  Kimble Argued Overruling Brulotte Is Justified 
In an attempt to establish the requisite “superspecial 
justification” for overruling Brulotte, Kimble made two arguments: 
first, that Brulotte hinged on an economic error—namely on an 
assumption that post-expiration royalties are always anticompetitive; 
and second, that Brulotte suppresses technological innovation and 
harms the national economy by preventing parties from reaching 
agreements to commercialize patents.61 
1.  Brulotte Erred in Assuming Post-Expiration Royalties Are 
Always Anticompetitive 
Kimble asked the Court to abandon Brulotte’s bright-line rule in 
favor of a more flexible, case-by-case approach based on antitrust 
law’s rule-of-reason.62 Kimble argued that “Brulotte’s per se rule 
makes little sense” because patent licensing agreements often 
increase rather than decrease competition, both before and after the 
 
 58. The Court explained that the approach Kimble had suggested would limit outcome 
predictability and an even-handed application of the law because courts would have to assess 
each case independently in order to determine whether it’s terms violate the Act. Id. at 2411. 
 59. Id. at 2410. 
 60. Id. (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. at 2404–05. 
 62. The rule-of-reason is intended to promote trade and fair commerce. Generally, the “rule 
of reason” functions to void “[a]ll contracts where there is a bare restraint of trade and no more; . . 
. where special matter appears so as to make it a reasonable and useful contract, the presumption 
is excluded.” AUSTIN T. STICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS: ANTITRUST LAWS § 40 
(1972); Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2404 (2015). 
Fall 2016] WITH GREAT POWER 759 
patent expires.63 Longer payment periods typically correlate with 
lower, more affordable royalty rates; thus a patent holder may license 
the patent to numerous licensees, fostering more competition.64 
Kimble added that post-patent-expiration royalties further incentivize 
competition because the licensee has a continuing obligation to pay 
royalties, whereas new companies can begin making and selling a 
similar product while undercutting the licensee on price.65 
The Court conceded that it “see[s] no error in that [] analysis,” 
even adding that “a broad scholarly consensus supports Kimble’s 
view of the competitive effects of post-expiration royalties.”66 Still, 
the Court was reluctant to take stare decisis off of its pedestal. In its 
attempted justification, the Court stated that it “has viewed stare 
decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases involving the 
Sherman Act;”67 thus, if Brulotte had been an antitrust case rather 
than a patent case, the Court would be inclined to agree.68 And just to 
cover all its bases, the Court further reasoned that “even assuming 
that Brulotte relied on an economic misjudgment, Congress is the 
right entity to fix it.”69 
a.  The Court deferred all arguments to Congress 
In fact, the Court continuously referenced Congress as the only 
body capable of providing Kimble the relief he sought, stating that 
this is a subject matter “more appropriately addressed to Congress,”70 
and that “[c]ritics of the Brulotte rule must seek relief not from this 
Court but from Congress.”71 Moreover, the Court added, 
“Congress . . . has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte, 
and has even rebuffed bills that would have replaced Brulotte’s per 
se rule with the standard Kimble urges.”72 The Court thus interpreted 
Congress’s silence as “enhanc[ing] even the usual precedential force 
 
 63. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (citing numerous treaties and articles that critique Brulotte). 
 67. Id. (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 2413 (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. at 2405. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2404 (citing Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 82–83 (2007) (Brulotte has 
governed licensing agreements for more than half a century)); see, e.g., S. 1200, 100th Cong., 1st 
Sess., Tit. II (1987) (providing that no patent owner would be guilty of “illegal extension of the 
patent right by reason of his or her licensing practices . . . unless such practices . . . violate the 
antitrust laws”).  
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we accord to our interpretations of statutes.”73 The Court explained 
that Congress has repeatedly amended the patent laws, including 35 
U.S.C. § 154, Contents and Term of Patent, the specific provision 
upon which Brulotte rested, and still Brulotte survived every such 
change.74 Hence, the Court concluded, “Congress’s continual 
reworking of the patent laws—but never of the Brulotte rule—further 
supports leaving the decision in place.”75 
2. Brulotte Suppresses Technological Innovations and Prevents the 
Commercialization of Patents 
Kimble also argued that Brulotte should be overturned because 
it runs counter to patent policy—the goal of which is to promote 
innovation.76 He asserted that Brulotte “discourages technological 
innovation and does significant damage to the American economy” 
by preventing parties from reaching agreements to commercialize 
patents.77 In support of this argument, Kimble maintained that post-
patent royalty payments allow for more flexibility in payment 
arrangements, and a more precise allocation of risk.78 
In response, the Court stated, “[m]aybe. Or, then again, maybe 
not.”79 The Court elaborated that neither Kimble nor his amici 
offered any empirical evidence that Brulotte “imposes any 
meaningful drag on innovation.”80 Additionally, the Court confessed, 
“truth be told, if forced to decide that issue, we would not know 
where or how to start.”81 Conveniently, the Court dismissed 
Kimble’s argument by admittedly reiterating the “opinion’s refrain” 
that “claims that a statutory precedent has ‘serious and harmful 
 
 73. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410 (citing Watson, 552 U.S. at 82–83) (referencing a period of 
“Congressional acquiescence” then totaling only fourteen years). 
 74. Id. at 2410; see, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532(a), 
108 Stat. 4983 (1994) (increasing the length of the patent term); Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (limiting patent-misuse claims). 
 75. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410.  
 76. Id. at 2414. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Kimble argued that extending the ability to pay royalties post-patent expiration will 
allow for more economic flexibility because parties can choose to either pay a larger lump-sum 
up front, and pay less to the patent holder in royalty fees; or, those with less liquid capital up 
front, may choose to pay a small fee for the use of the patent at the forefront, but pay the patent 
holder a higher percentage of royalties over a specified number of years. Kimble further argues 
that the ability to structure the most mutually beneficial agreement prevents the discouragement 
of technological innovation and influx of economy by lowering the barrier of entry. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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consequences’ for innovation are . . . ‘more appropriately addressed 
to Congress.’”82 
When the majority was not deferring responsibility, it was 
ignoring it under the pretext of stare decisis, stating, “[w]hat we can 
decide, we can undecide. But stare decisis teaches that we should 
exercise that authority sparingly.”83 Thus, the majority declined to 
overrule its decision in Brulotte due to an absence of “special 
justification” for departing from precedent.84 The Court concluded 
that Kimble’s claims “fail[ed] to clear stare decisis’s high bar,” and 
thereby affirmed the lower court’s decision in refusing to enforce the 
entirety of the settlement agreement between Kimble and Marvel.85  
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court erred in applying a heightened standard of stare 
decisis by indolently relying on Brulotte, which is rooted in 
inaccurate economic policy, and most often functions to upset 
parties’ expectations. Accordingly, the Court’s approach represents a 
misapplication of the stare decisis doctrine and highlights an 
incredible example of judicial overreach. Moreover, by categorizing 
Brulotte as a case of statutory interpretation, the Court granted itself 
the privilege of applying a “superpowered form of stare decisis” in 
order to justify its reluctance in overruling the decision, as well as 
qualify deferring all difficult arguments to Congress.86 Ultimately, 
rather than using Kimble as an opportunity to “clear the err,” so to 
speak, the Court perpetuated the overstepping of its predecessors’ 
boundaries by reaffirming the flawed Brulotte decision. 
A.  Kimble Serves to Reaffirm a Case of Judicial Overreach 
The notion that the Court was improperly adhering to stare 
decisis was not lost on the majority.87 The Court stated, “Respecting 
stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions . . . . [I]t is 
usually more important that the applicable law be settled, than that it 
 
 82. Id. (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (2014) 
(emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 2415 (citing S. LEE & S. DITKO, supra note 1, at 13 (1962) (“In this world, with 
great power there must also come—great responsibility”)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 2412. 
 86. See id. at 2410. 
 87. Id. at 2409. 
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be settled right.”88 Ridiculousness of that sentiment notwithstanding, 
the inclusion of this statement in the Court’s opinion functions as a 
blatant admission of error. 
The Brulotte Court exceeded the boundaries of its judicial 
powers by redefining the parameters of patent law under the guise of 
statutory interpretation. Consequently, Kimble serves to reaffirm a 
case of judicial overreach by failing to overturn the erroneous 
precedent. Thus, by couching its decision on the doctrine of stare 
decisis, the Court’s rationale was dually improper: first, in its 
misapplication of the doctrine itself, and second, in the flawed 
reasoning that the doctrine carries “enhanced force”89 because of 
Brulotte’s supposed interpretation of the Act.90  
 1.  Brulotte Is Devoid of Statutory Interpretation 
The Act provides that a patent grants certain exclusive rights to 
the patentee and “his heirs or assigns” for a term of twenty years.91 
Among those rights is the power to exact royalties on a patented 
invention.92 The Act, however, says nothing whatsoever about post-
expiration royalties, nor does it preclude their contractibility.93 
Nonetheless, the Brulotte Court held that such royalties are 
“unlawful per se” without supporting that decision with any 
language from the Act itself.94  
Instead, the Brulotte Court’s rationale was more akin to antitrust 
concepts, reasoning that post-expiration royalties would enlarge the 
patent holder’s monopoly on that idea “by tieing the sale or use of 
the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.”95 
Ironically, the Kimble Court, relying on this precedent, stated that it 
“has viewed stare decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases 
involving the Sherman Act,”96 which deals precisely with the anti-
 
 88. Id. (emphasis added). 
 89. See id. at 2409. 
 90. See id. at 2414. 
 91. 35 U.S.C § 154(a)(1) and (2) (2012). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948) (indicating “a 
patentee may license others to make and vend his invention and collect a royalty therefor.”). 
 93. See generally 35 U.S.C § 154 (finding no mention of the illegality or prohibition of post-
expiration royalties); see also Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“nothing in the text of the Act even arguably forbids licensing agreements that provide for post-
expiration royalties.”). 
 94. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964); 35 U.S.C § 154. 
 95. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33. 
 96. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412. 
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competitive rationale the Court adopted in its decision making, yet 
contrarily required a “superspecial justification to warrant reversing 
Brulotte.”97  
In his dissent, Justice Samuel Alito highlighted the majority’s 
erroneous categorization of Brulotte as relating to statutory 
interpretation, stating, “[W]e do not give super-duper protection to 
decisions that do not actually interpret a statute.”98 He further 
emphasized that “[Brulotte] was not simply a case of incorrect 
statutory interpretation. It was not really statutory interpretation at 
all.”99  
Moreover, since the Court’s decision in 1964, Brulotte has been 
widely criticized as a decision based on the “free-floating product of 
a misplaced fear of monopoly” rather than on an interpretation of 
either the patent clause of the Constitution, the patent statute, or any 
other statute for that matter.100 Thus, notwithstanding the merit of 
antitrust or other anti-competition arguments, the Brulotte Court’s 
rationale was nonetheless devoid of any interpretation of the Act 
itself.101  
2.  Kimble’s Rationale Is Inconsistent with 
the Intent of Congress  
Despite the lack of statutory support and decades of 
disagreement, the Kimble Court erroneously relied on Brulotte rather 
than overruling it. The majority reasoned that there had not been an 
“erosion of doctrinal underpinnings” upon which Brulotte rested, 
thus the “the primary reason” for overruling the precedent was 
inapplicable.102 Further, the Court defined the requisite erosion as 
“either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by 
Congress” that nullifies the basis of a past decision,103 yet dismissed 
 
 97. Id. at 2410 (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 100. See e.g., Scheiber v. Dolby Labs. Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, 
J.) (Brulotte has been "severely, and as it [s]eems to us, with all due respect, justly criticized . . . . 
However, we have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no matter how dubious its 
reasoning strikes us, or even how out of touch with the Supreme Court’s current thinking the 
decision seems"); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without 
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive 
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1027 (1999) (“Our analysis thus suggests that Brulotte should 
be overruled.”). 
 101. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
 102. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410. 
 103. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)). 
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these possibilities with the sweeping statement, “the core feature of 
patent laws on which Brulotte relied remains just the same,” citing 
35 U.S.C § 154—Contents and term of patent.104 Though patent laws 
have remained largely unchanged since their inception, the Court 
ignored a post-Brulotte amendment to the very section of the statute 
it cited that specifically concerns the exaction of royalties on 
patented inventions.105  
On November 29, 2000, Congress amended the patent laws in a 
manner that exposed potential patent holders to a higher risk of 
infringement by requiring that patent applications be accessible to 
the public prior to granting the applicant exclusive patent rights.106 
As an attempt to compensate applicants for the negative impact of 
early disclosure, Congress expanded the rights accorded by patent 
protection by including a “provisional right” codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(d).107 This amendment vests the patentee with the additional 
right to obtain a reasonable royalty on infringement occurring 
between the time of publication and issuance of the patent.”108 
More importantly, Congress specifically defined a “time 
limitation” on obtaining pre-patent royalties, confining the patentee 
to a six-year statute of limitations, as enumerated in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(d)(3).109 Yet nowhere in the amendment, the statute, or the 
language of the Act did Congress delineate a similar expiration date 
on current patents, nor did it forbid post-patent royalties. 
Despite this, the Court reasoned that Congress’s failure to 
amend the Act to specifically include the right to royalties beyond 
the life of the patent equated Congress’s intent to preclude such an 
expansive application of the Act.110 Frankly, this reasoning is absurd; 
 
 104. See id. at 2410–11. 
 105. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)(A)(i) (“[A] patent shall include the right to obtain a 
reasonable royalty from any person who . . . makes, uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United 
States the invention as claimed in the published patent application.). See generally Kimble, 135 S. 
Ct. 2401 (2015) (finding no mention of amended section 154(d) anywhere in the opinion). 
 106. Judith R.S. Stern, Reasonable Royalty Damages After Publication and Before the Patent 
Issues: Interpretation of Provisional Rights Provisions, BOS. PATENT LAW ASS’N, May 2005, at 
3, http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.bpla.org/resource/resmgr/Newsletters/05-02.pdf 
?hhSearchTerms=%222005%22. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1) and (3). 
 109. 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(3); see Patrick J. Birde & Nicholas J. Nowak, 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) 
Grants Patent Applicants Provisional Rights in Their Published, THE INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
STRATEGIST 1, 3, (Sept. 2003), http://www.kenyon.com/media/~/media/Files/Publication 
%20PDFs/2003-09-01_Rights.ashx. 
 110. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (indicating that “Congress has spurned multiple 
opportunities to reverse Brulotte,” but that long congressional acquiescence is proof of their 
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it is akin to arguing the permissibility of wrongful conduct for as 
long and until one is told otherwise. The Court is essentially stating 
that until Congress expressly provides for post-patent royalties, it 
will continue operating under the assumption that such a right is 
prohibited.111 
3.  The History of the Act Further Refutes  
the Court’s Reasoning 
The Kimble Court attempted to cement this argument by treating 
Brulotte as the seminal case for the Act’s interpretation, proclaiming, 
“Brulotte has governed licensing agreements for more than half a 
century,”112 and thus the Court “prefer[s] not to unsettle stable 
law.”113 Yet, despite its praise, Brulotte’s reign remains relatively 
recent.114 The right of patent protection spans over two hundred 
years, predating even the Constitution.115 As such, courts and 
Congress alike have applied and interpreted the parameters of the 
Act for centuries in a manner inconsistent with Brulotte’s, and thus 
Kimble’s, understanding of the law.  
Accordingly, before the Brulotte Court redefined the parameters 
of the Act, courts had interpreted the law to presume that royalties 
were not to be paid after the expiration of a patent; however, parties 
may contract to the contrary.116 Thus, rather than statutory 
 
reluctance to do so). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 2410. 
 113. See id. at 2411 (indicating that Brulotte’s “close relation to a whole web of precedents 
means that reversing it could threaten others”). 
 114. Brulotte was decided in 1964, whereas patent law dates back to the “beginning of our 
nation.” The Origins of Patent and Copyright Law, 23 BILL OF RTS. IN ACTION (Constitutional 
Rights Found., Los Angeles, Cal.), no. 4, 2008, http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action 
/bria-23-4-a-the-origins-of-patent-and-copyright-law#.UU-OeVdMy3M.  
 115. Id. (“[The Framers] gave Congress the power to ‘Promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts’ by giving an economic incentive to inventors and writers. That power, and the 
national patent and copyright laws that soon followed, have stimulated the country’s economy for 
more than 200 years”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 116. See, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Chem. Found. Inc., 93 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1937) 
(“There is a presumption that royalties are not to be paid after the expiration of a patent; if the 
intention is to have them continue longer, the parties should phrase their contract in language 
from which such intention may fairly be inferred.”); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
270 F. 518, 525 (2d Cir. 1920) (“Although the general rule is that liability to pay royalties 
terminates upon the expiration of the patent, the parties may contract to the contrary.”); Sproull v. 
Pratt & Whitney Co., 108 F. 963, 965 (2d Cir. 1901) (“Royalties are not payable upon articles 
manufactured and sold after the expiration of the life of the patent, however, parties may, of 
course, contract as they choose”); Bettis Rubber Co. v. Kleaver, 104 Cal. App. 2d 821, 824–25 
(1951) (indicating that contracts involving the payment of royalties for patented inventions may 
exceed the life of the patent if so intended by the parties). 
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interpretation, the Court ironically engaged in an act of policymaking 
when deciding Brulotte117—a responsibility the Kimble Court 
repeatedly reiterated as one entrusted only to Congress.118 Yet rather 
than correct this unwarranted expansion of the Act upon its 
reevaluation in Kimble, “[t]he Court employ[ed] stare decisis, 
normally a tool for restraint, to reaffirm a clear case of judicial 
overreach.”119  
B.  Post-Patent Expiration Royalties Do Not Enlarge  
the Patent’s Monopoly 
A licensing agreement that provides for the payment of royalties 
after a patent’s term has expired does not, as the Court in Brulotte 
asserted, enlarge the patentee’s monopoly or extend the term of the 
patent.120 Instead, it simply creates a contractual right between the 
licensor (holder of the now-expired patent) and the licensee with 
whom he or she contracted, for the sale and/or use of the invention in 
question—similar to any other such agreement not pertaining to 
intellectual property rights.121 In the fifty-two years since Brulotte 
was decided, courts and commentators have heavily criticized it as 
economically irrational.122 Contrary to the Court’s reasoning in 
Brulotte, and thereafter reiterated in Kimble, the application of post-
patent expiration royalties does not enlarge the patent’s monopoly 
because it does not prevent the patented idea from entering into the 
public domain upon its expiration.123 Instead, “post-expiration 
royalties merely amortize the price of using patented technology 
and . . . do not necessarily harm competition because new 
competitors are free to enter the market without paying royalties after 
 
 117. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 2405 (majority opinion). 
 119. Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “stare decisis does not require [the 
Supreme Court] to retain [] baseless and damaging precedent”). 
 120. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). 
 121. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (indicating that a patent “shall be assignable in law by an instrument 
in writing); see also Flatspikes, LLC v. Softspikes, LLC, 913 F.Supp. 2d 208, 213 (D. Md. 2012) 
(“The mere presence of a possible question about patents, however, does not convert the state law 
breach of contract action into one arising under the patent laws”); 35 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (noting 
that the civil action must arise under any Act of Congress relating to patents). 
 122. Scott W. Doyle, et al., Brulotte Rule Upheld Despite Suspect Economic Rationale, 
LAW360, (June 23, 2015, 6:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/670682/brulotte-rule 
-upheld-despite-suspect-economic-rationale. 
 123. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2414; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (discussing the patent’s term 
and duration as ending twenty years after the date on which the application was file, at which 
point that invention enters the public domain). 
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the expiration of the patent, even if prior market participants 
continue to pay royalties.”124 Thus, not only was Brulotte 
unsubstantiated by the language and terms of the Act, but it was also 
based on an economic theory that has since been debunked.125 
Similarly, Kimble argued that such an arrangement might even 
encourage competition because others would be free to make, use, or 
sell the patented idea after its expiration; and, because of diminished 
overhead costs, it may even occur at a rate lower than originally 
provided by the licensee.126 Upon the patent’s expiration, the public 
would have unfettered access to its use, as intended by the Act, and 
only the licensee would be required to pay for its continuing use, as 
per the terms of the parties’ agreement.127 
Jay Dratler, Jr., the Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property 
at The University of Akron School of Law and author of Licensing 
Intellectual Property, the definitive treatise in its field, added:  
It is therefore worth noting that the per se rule of Brulotte is 
an anachronism with little or no economic justification. As 
one of the few remaining vestiges of Justice Douglas’ one-
man crusade against patent protection, it is a lonely per se 
outpost in a rule-of-reason world. In attempting to draw a 
bright line outlawing royalties after patent expiration, it 
relies on formal distinctions, rather than economic 
substance, in contravention of the growing trend in antitrust 
law.128 
Moreover, contracts allowing for post-patent expiration royalties 
differ little, both competitively and economically, from contracts that 
permissibly provide for periodic or installment payments for the use 
or sale of unpatented goods.129 However, the Brulotte Court rejected 
 
 124. Doyle, supra note 122. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2416. 
 127. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2) (indicating that a patent holder obtains the exclusive rights to 
the patent for a duration of twenty years); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (d)(1) and (3) (discussing that a patent 
holder has the right to obtain a reasonable royalty on his or her patent, and that that right shall be 
available only when brought not later than six years after the patent is issued. The language of the 
Act, however, makes no mention of when the royalties must terminate or expire). 
 128. JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, § 4.04 (1994) (Arguing 
that there is a growing realization among the courts that “the competitive effect of patent 
licensing is a matter of antitrust law, not patent law, and one to be governed by rules of 
substantial economic effect, not barren legal formalism. This trend promises, in the long run, to 
undermine Brulotte to the point where the Supreme Court may feel compelled to revise or 
overrule it.”). 
 129. Id.  
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this argument absent any substantiated ground for their reasoning.130 
Instead, the Court dismissed that it was “unable to conjecture what 
the bargaining position of the parties might have been and what 
resultant arrangement might have emerged had the provision for 
post-expiration royalties been divorced from the patent and nowise 
subject to its leverage.”131 In sum, the Court criticized contracts 
providing for post-expiration royalties as a “bald attempt” to enlarge 
a patent’s monopoly, despite decades of economic justification that 
prove otherwise.132  
C.  Brulotte and Kimble Impede Contract Law and  
Parties’ Ability to Attain the True Value of Their Patents  
The judicial overreach in Brulotte caused an unintended 
expansion of patent protection that impedes contract law and disrupts 
parties’ ability to contract freely due to the misguided assumption of 
patent monopoly expansion—a view that was erroneously 
perpetuated by Kimble.  
1.  Federal Patent Law Does Not Preempt State Contract  
Law in This Case 
The Brulotte Court reasoned, “patents are in the federal domain; 
and ‘whatever the legal devise employed,’ a projection of the patent 
monopoly after the patent expires is not enforceable.”133 Building 
upon that argument, the Kimble Court further stated that, “by virtue 
of federal law . . . we have deemed unenforceable private contract 
provisions limiting free use of [articles on which the patent has 
expired].”134 The Kimble Court argued that “to permit such a result, 
whether or not authorized ‘by express contract’ would impermissibly 
undermine patent laws” by expanding the patent holder’s monopoly 
of that invention.135 
However, both Brulotte and Kimble drew this reasoning from a 
line of cases that dealt primarily with contracts contesting a patent’s 
validity, rather than the parameters of patent protection post-patent 
expiration.136 Thus, while federal patent law generally preempts state 
 
 130. Id. § 4.05(d) (citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S 29, 32 (1964)). 
 131. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)).  
 134. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2407 (citing Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 256).  
 135. Id. (quoting Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 255–56). 
 136. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668–75 (refusing to enforce a contract requiring 
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contract law,137 the language of the patent act does not prohibit post-
term royalties, or the possibility of contracting for them.138 
Moreover, the historical application and interpretation of the Act 
did not preclude the payment of such royalties pursuant to the federal 
statutory language, but rather presumed their termination upon 
expiration of the patent, absent a valid contract indicating otherwise. 
Thus, contrary to what the Brulotte and Kimble Courts have asserted, 
federal patent law does not supersede contract law in this case, but 
rather the two work in conjunction with one another. 
2.  Brulotte Hinders a Patentee’s Ability to Contract for the  
True Value of The Patent 
The term “royalty” ordinarily envisages a duty to make, and a 
corresponding right to receive, payments proportionate to the use of 
patented methods or machines.139 This type of payment recognizes 
that the market value of intellectual property is inherently uncertain 
and unpredictable.140 In consequence, “it measures that value as it 
unfolds, in the course of commercial exploitation of the underlying 
intellectual property,” thus sparing the licensor and the licensee the 
risk of guessing at market value in advance.141 Accordingly, the 
payment of royalties as a direct reflection of the use or sale of a 
patented invention is the most accurate representation of the patent’s 
worth142 and a system of compensation favored and relied upon in a 
broad spectrum of business transactions. Thus, the decision in 
Brulotte, and its reiteration in Kimble, hinders parties’ ability to 
 
a licensee to pay royalties while contesting a patent’s validity); Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 255–56.  
 137. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (“[Patent] laws, like 
other laws of the United States enacted pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law 
of the land. When state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is ‘familiar doctrine’ 
that the federal policy ‘may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied’ by the state law”) (internal 
citations omitted)); see also Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) 
(indicating that “federal patent laws prevent a State from prohibiting the copying and selling of 
unpatented articles.”). 
 138. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); DRATLER, supra note 128 (explaining the permissibility and 
parameters of exacting royalties on patented ideas by delineating a start date but never an end 
date). 
 139. Bettis Rubber Co. v. Kleaver, 233 P.2d 82, 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (citing Eastman Oil 
Well Survey Corp. v. Lane-Wells Co., 136 P.2d 564, 565 (Cal. 1943)). 
 140. See DRATLER, supra note 128, at § 4.01. 
 141. Id.  
 142. J. Gregory Sidak, The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 
989, 990 (2014), https://www.criterioneconomics.com/the-proper-royalty-base-for-patent 
-damages.html. 
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contract according to the actual value of the patent.143  
3.  Brulotte Disrupts Contractual Expectations 
In Kimble, the Court conceded, “the Brulotte rule . . . prevents 
some parties from entering into deals they desire.”144 The agreement 
at the heart of Kimble proved case and point.145 Marvel agreed to 
purchase Kimble’s patent in exchange for a lump sum of about half a 
million dollars, as well as a three percent royalty on all of Marvel’s 
future sales of the Web-Blaster and similar products.146 The parties 
set no end date for royalties, “apparently contemplating that they 
would continue for as long as kids want to imitate Spider-Man.”147 
Accordingly, the Court’s decision to void that contractual agreement 
insofar as it allowed royalties that exceeded beyond the patented 
term not only robbed Kimble of the true value of his patent, as 
discussed above, but also disrupted Kimble’s contractual 
expectations.148  
Despite admission by both parties to being unaware of the 
precedent set by Brulotte at the time their agreement was 
negotiated,149 the Court maintained that stare decisis was “at [its] 
acme” because “parties are especially likely to rely on such 
precedents when ordering their affairs.”150 However, the Court’s 
belief that there is a “reasonable possibility that parties have 
structured business transactions in light of Brulotte” is fanciful.151  
Further, the Court’s only support for this conclusion was Marvel’s 
self-serving assertion that “some contracts might not specify an end 
date for royalties because the parties expect Brulotte to supply the 
default rule.”152 
Notwithstanding the fact that Marvel’s assertion was wholly 
unsubstantiated by evidence, even operating under the assumption of 
 
 143. See Kimble v. Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2015 (2015). 
 144. Id. at 2408. 
 145. See id. at 2406 (referencing the deal desired by, and denied to, Kimble). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 2417 (Alito, J., dissenting) (indicating that if the parties had been aware of 
Brulotte, they might have agreed to higher payments during the patent term, or perhaps are larger 
lump-sum up front). 
 149. Id. at 2406. 
 150. See id. at 2410 (indicating that “so long as [there is] a reasonable possibility that parties 
have structured their business transactions in light of Brulotte, [the Court] ha[s] one more reason 
to let it stand”). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 2417 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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its truth would dispel the Court’s rationale. 153 Pursuant to the law of 
contracts, if parties actually relied on Brulotte to supply a default 
rule, courts would enforce the contracts as the parties intended.154 
Consequently, there would be no need for the Court to refuse to 
overrule Brulotte on the theory that it would upset parties’ 
expectations—which, paradoxically, is exactly what ensued by 
upholding the flawed precedent.155  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Kimble Court disregarded statutory amendment that 
qualifies overturning Brulotte, thereby ruling in a matter inconsistent 
with Congress’s intent and reaffirming a clear case of judicial 
overreach. Moreover, rather than “clearing the err,” the Court 
poignantly directed all arguments back to Congress’s doorstep. But 
as Justice Alito aptly stated, “[W]e cannot ‘properly place on the 
shoulders of Congress’ the entire burden of correcting the Court’s 
own error.”156 And when the majority was not deferring 
responsibility, it was ignoring it under the pretext of stare decisis, 
ultimately impeding parties’ ability to contract freely, and 
impermissibly altering the parameters of the Act. The Supreme Court 
is undeniably endowed with incredible power, but when faced with 
the opportunity to use that power for good and not for evil, the 
Court’s deflection was too great even for Spider-Man to save. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. RICHARD A. LORD, 27 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 70:124 (4th ed. 2003) (“The 
prevailing mandate is that mistakes of fact and law weigh in equally on equity’s scales of justice, 
making relief available where the intention of the parties has been thwarted by a mutual mistake 
of law.”). 
 155. See generally Kimble, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (explaining how the Court’s application of the 
Brulotte rule served to upset Kimble’s contractual expectations of obtaining an indefinite royalty 
on his patent, as stipulated by the parties, thereby undervaluing the value of his patent). 
 156. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69–70 
(1946)). 
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